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Abstract  
This paper focuses on 3 features of Freyenhagen’s Aristotelian version of Adorno. 
(a) It challenges the strict negativism Freyenhagen finds in Adorno. If we have 
morally relevant interests in ourselves, it is implicit that we have a standard by 
which to understand what is both good and bad for us (our interests). Because 
strict negativism operates without reference to what is good, it seems to be 
detached from real interests too. Torture, it is argued, is, among other things, a 
violation of those interests. (b) Freyenhagen identifies the “impulse” in Adorno as 
an untutored yet moral reaction to morally demanding situations. The plausibility 
of this primitivism and its compatibility with Adorno’s general worries about 
immediacy are considered. (c) The disruptive character of Adorno’s version of the 
categorical imperative, its willingness to complicate action through wholesale 
reflection on the norms of what we are committing ourselves to, is set in contrast 
with Freyenhagen’s Aristotelian claim that certain notions, such as “humanity,” 
cannot be intelligibly questioned.  
 
Unlike many thinkers who are considered to be moral philosophers, Adorno offers his 
readers a sizeable number of opinions about the moral condition of the world. The 
theoretical basis that sustains or gives possible coherence to these opinions is, though, 
notoriously elusive. Adorno fiercely rejects philosophical efforts to explain why we 
ought to act or respond in certain ways to morally pertinent situations. He claims that 
rationalism distances us from feeling and action, that universalism neglects particular 
experiences, that the shared norms of our communities are implicated in life-
destroying practices, and that sentimentality, history shows us, is irrational and 
dangerous. These stances seem to deprive Adorno of any recognisable framework 
within which to defend his own moral statements in anything other than conventional 
terms. Perhaps we should leave Adorno at that level. It is hard not to doubt that he is 
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actually attempting to ground or source normativity in any way that could be expected 
of moral philosophers, not least because he does not explicitly commit himself to any 
general theory. Fabian Freyenhagen’s contention in the concluding chapter of 
Adorno’s Practical Philosophy is therefore notable. He maintains that an Aristotelian 
notion of moral evaluation lies behind Adorno’s various assessments of the norms and 
practices of modern life. Furthermore, Freyenhagen understands Adorno’s 
Aristotelianism to be compatible with “negativism,” a kind of procedural commitment 
Freyenhagen also ascribes to Adorno. Negativism consists in adopting a purely 
critical stance which makes no use of nor expresses any positive images of a better 
world. It does not, however, silence moral philosophy since, on Freyenhagen’s 
account, we can know what is bad for us, in some morally relevant way, without 
knowing what is positive or good for us. The Adorno that emerges from 
Freyenhagen’s interpretation is robustly systematic. 
 
This consideration of Freyenhagen’s book will concentrate mainly on the chapter on 
Adorno’s Aristotelianism, though some of the book’s wider claims will also come 
into view. No issue need be taken with Freyenhagen’s sensitive and detailed textual 
interpretations. The discussion will focus on a broader concern. Philosophers like 
Adorno seem to give their interpreters a number of versions of themselves from which 
to select, should we be in search of a single line of reconstruction. What this paper 
will examine is whether Freyenhagen’s impressively executed choice allows us to 
make sense of the moral phenomena that are of evident concern to Adorno. 
 
1.  
Freyenhagen sets out the Aristotelian thesis that moral evaluation is structurally 
similar to the evaluation of all things (p. 232). Evaluation relates to the specific ways 
of functioning that are “appropriate” to each “life form.” Appropriateness is, the 
theory holds, an objective quality. It refers to the way a thing is somehow supposed to 
be. Because the sense of what is appropriate is gleaned from perceived ways that 
things actually work, the style of thinking Freyenhagen describes holds some appeal 
among conservative-minded thinkers too. They tell us what the objective functions 
appropriate to human beings are. Those functions are then used as a kind of measure 
of how well we are acting. Failure to function in those ways is considered to be an 
objective violation of what we are said really to be. Conservatives are not interested in 
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whether these functions might be settlements that followed from power struggles in 
the past. They are deemed, instead, to be somewhat natural and unforced. 
Conservative functional evaluation might be labelled retrospective in that more often 
than not it comes into play when some supposed threat looms over the preferred social 
arrangements and moral values of conservatively minded people. 
 
Now one might suggest that progressively minded thinkers also share this type of 
analysis, and talk of conservative affinities is misleading. Progressive thinkers, for 
example, insist on the ongoing provision of social goods that have led to liberty and 
equality. Their outlook evidently involves some notion of what “objectively” allows 
for proper human, say autonomous, functioning. That notion grounds their resistance 
to any deviation from arrangements or policies which support that functioning. But 
there is an obvious point of departure from what we have seen in the conservative 
model. Progressives also believe that proposed improvements in social arrangements 
need not be defended in terms of any existing institution or practice. Values that are 
based on abstract notions of fairness or justice or freedom or whatever also motivate 
progressive ideals. No doubt progressive theory can be translated into the terms of 
“appropriateness” and “proper function” but its imaginative dimension means that it 
cannot be explanatorily accommodated within retrospective Aristotelianism. 
 
These few thoughts about the conservative appeal of Aristotelianism allow us to 
appreciate the audacious reach of Freyenhagen’s reading of Adorno as a kind of (1) 
proper functioning theorist (2) who offers nothing positive about possible human 
arrangements by limiting himself exclusively to identifying what is bad in the world. 
In taking us to the basis of his Aristotelian reading of Adorno, Freyenhagen cites the 
latter’s view that humanity is not yet “actualised.” He takes this to mean that there is 
some better way for human beings to be, though it is unknown: “According to Adorno, 
humanity is not something which we actually instantiate in virtue of being born as 
human animals, but it is a potential which we have and which is yet to be actualised” 
(p. 237). Since this functional actuality will stand in contrast with everything we take 
to be morally true in the world today, we can call this perspective on the opaque 
possibilities for our actualization a prospective one. 
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The difference between retrospective and prospective theories is at one level profound. 
The former arrogates a variety of common sense claim to objectivity in that it refers to 
certain institutions or norms that have, under some favoured measure, proven 
successful or stable. Its opponents, of course, doubt the success of this retrospection 
and point to its biases. The Adornian prospective thinker, as Freyenhagen explains 
him, uses, in contrast, no historical experience upon which to hang claims to realised 
actuality. That perspective is instead oriented towards a “not yet specifiable potential” 
(p. 243) whose actualisation “we cannot even conceptualise or imagine” (p. 239). And, 
as Adorno makes clear, we are not permitted to allow utopian images to guide us 
towards a fulfilled future. That is because we cannot be confident that our utopianism 
is not shaped by beliefs that originate in the very world we are critically assessing. 
Now Freyenhagen holds that we can nevertheless know what is bad for us even if we 
must not conjecture on what is good for us, that is, what would actualise our potential. 
Hence, we can know that something is bad for us even if we have no idea about how, 
if at all, it affects our full potential. 
 
This set of ideas takes us to the question of how normative assessments can be 
pursued within this Adorno inflected Aristotelianism. If Adorno has a prospective 
actuality in mind and cannot make any utterances about how things ought to be his 
theorising appears be non-historical. A prospective actuality does not exist and nor is 
it implied in the present. Were it implied then it would not stand in that relation of 
pure negativity that Freyenhagen takes to be a commitment of Adorno’s moral 
practical philosophy. Hence, when Freyenhagen’s Adorno declares that something is 
wrong, he does so without reference to any function to which we could attach a norm 
since that function is unknown. We can only, as we shall see in some detail, offer 
brute rejections of current suffering. Those complaints too are without a context in 
that they refer not to a being with a history, but simply to one with what Adorno, 
citing Brecht, called a “tormentable” body (Adorno, 1973, p. 286). 
 
Perhaps Freyenhagen is willing to attribute to Adorno the notion of a de-
contextualised capacity for normative assessment, that is, assessment which requires 
no sense of historical location. After all, Freyenhagen thinks of Aristotelianism as a 
way of grounding normativity which rescues normativity from the vicissitudes of 
social history (the evaluation of morals and things by reference to intrinsic functions). 
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His Adorno, therefore, is happy to be understood to be a theorist who is not dependent 
on history for the normativity of his moral opinions. Much of what takes Freyenhagen 
to that point—if this is indeed his line of thought—rests on what he understands to be 
entailed in the phenomenon of bodily suffering. The example of torture is central to 
the case. Torture is wrong because—and it seems exhaustively so—it causes creatures 
like us to suffer, it denies our proper realisation (whatever it might be: we cannot say), 
and it is inappropriate to us. Freyenhagen sets out the issue in this way: 
 
… the conjunction of (a) the pain of someone’s being tortured and (b) the 
requirement of the human life form to avoid pain if possible, gives the tortured 
person (as well as those responsive to reasons generally) an objective reason to 
end the torture. This point illuminates one aspect of why Aristotelians speak of 
objective reasons; the requirements we face are not figments of the imagination, 
projections, or constructions; but actual features of states of affairs or situations (p. 
235).  
 
When we ask, though, for an account of what these features might be in any specific 
situation, we probably move beyond monumental-sounding commandments and into 
the business of what we believe we are entitled to, some outline of where our interests 
lie, and why. That is not to say that the tortured person must offer us a good reason for 
why their agony should cease. What is in focus here is not the cry of pain but the 
phenomenon of torture as it affects our humanity. It seems, though, that 
Freyenhagen’s Adorno might not help us with that feature of the phenomenon, and 
this is because his negativity gives us norms that are either brute (relating to pain 
avoidance) or prospective (relating to an unimaginable version of ourselves). 
 
A story of what counts as the kind of pain the human life form does not want requires, 
we might think, a sense of the normative context in which it takes place given the 
presence of even severe pain in many voluntary and fulfilling undertakings. Granted, 
if we define torture as the infliction of unwanted pain on an individual, we seem to 
have a phenomenon that looks to be bad without any further analysis. But the point 
here is not that there could be contexts in which some human beings seem perfectly at 
ease with what horrifies us as torture. Questioning Freyenhagen’s Adorno with a kind 
of spurious relativism would not be a worthy response. The work of context, rather, 
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relates to the biographical story. Torture is wrong certainly not only because of the 
agony it inflicts but also because of its shattering and humiliating effects on the 
person’s sense of self, integrity, and body. Hence, its wrongs go beyond what we can 
infer from animal aversion. Furthermore, it is not only the unrealised potential of 
victims that may forever be forestalled. Their actuality, most obviously, is ruined, as 
Freyenhagen indeed notes. Describing those who suffered in the concentration camps, 
he writes: “The way they were treated completely destroyed the possibility of their 
seeing any sense in their life” (p. 245). If this, though, is at least part of the right way 
to capture our revulsion at torture, it operates from a different space from either the 
brute or the prospective. And this raises a challenge to one of Freyenhagen’s principal 
claims: “Insofar as we can know what basis human functioning requires (and what a 
shortfall from it would involve) without having (positive) knowledge of the human 
potential, we can know the bad without knowing the good” (p. 240). But we must 
know the good in order to give an adequate account of torture. We know who we are 
and we also know that we have an interest in maintaining—not necessarily even 
augmenting or further realising—ourselves according to that image. That is a good for 
us. Torture, when it is geared towards betrayal for instance, can threaten our deepest 
sense of the commitments that make us who we take ourselves to be. Winston Smith 
is broken—his personality eliminated—not by his hysterical terror of rats but by his 
renunciation of his beloved in the (literal) face of that terror. The objections we have 
to the treatment we receive—the “bad” for us—are likely to be intelligible in terms of 
how we would like to live: some way we believe we are entitled to live, the way, 
perhaps, we do live. This aspect of the phenomenon is not reducible to anything that 
physical agony alone might intimate to us and nor does it belong to the speculative 
space of unrealised humanity. Freyenhagen’s Adorno holds that human beings now 
lack “basic human functioning.” That functioning “requires at least a minimal level of 
actively choosing how to structure one’s life, of developing a sense of the self with an 
extended life story, of having meaningful relationships with others, etc.” (p. 241). If, 
however, human beings are now marked by such profound deficits—a world perhaps 
even more deranged than the one we usually expect to find in Adorno—part of what 
we saw above as the horror of torture does not apply to them. These would be human 
beings, we might surmise, who could not know humiliation. With its victims lacking a 
sense of value, life projects, and attachments, torture would register principally as a 
physical violation. 
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Attentive Adorno interpreters find themselves confronted with the question of 
whether he wishes to suspend all construction of alternative values—strict 
negativism—or whether, slightly less broadly, he is opposed to every feature of life 
that has been marked by rationalisation and capitalism. The second line does not 
preclude the possibility that we have interests that are not saturated by the norms of 
the social totality. There are features of our lives, beyond animality, that are not 
falsely meaningful. (For example, Adorno may lament what he sees as the 
transactional quality of marriage today, but he is unlikely to doubt that individuals 
continue to see much of the value of their lives as bound up with their familial 
attachments.) One might expect Freyenhagen’s Adorno to identify with the first 
option. Interestingly, ground is implicitly given to the second. The thingly reality of 
human beings in societies today, he writes, 
 
… causes immense suffering (both directly and indirectly in fuelling aggression 
towards and repression of others), and analysing the causes of this suffering would 
suggest, at least from an Adornian perspective, that human beings have a basic 
need to be recognised as individuals, as centres of irreplaceable uniqueness (p. 
242). 
 
What we can see here is the use of a measure that rests, arguably, in second nature. 
(Second nature refers to those institutions and conventions that are produced by 
human action and which then govern human interactions, with an apparent law-
likeness, structure, and seeming independence from individual wills.) The notion of 
“irreplaceable uniqueness,” of course, has a history. It is not a concept to be derived 
from our animality. Indeed, Adorno himself does not deny that the sense we might 
have that our humanity is jeopardised owes something to the attenuated inheritance of 
earlier notions of Bildung and of social liberalism. 1  And, if the category of 
irreplaceable uniqueness excites some kind of normative reaction, we might think that 
it is a reaction to potential that is to some degree actualised. Were it purely 
prospective the talk about needs—as individuals—would no longer refer to features of 
experience that we have come to value. 
                                                 
1 Hence, the famous “petitio principii” of social freedom and social integration with which Adorno and 
Horkheimer open their Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
8 
 
2. 
A confusing feature of Adorno’s various thoughts on morality is the connection he 
makes between action and the obscure notion of “impulse.” “Impulse” appears to be a 
term that stands for a number of different things, depending upon the very specific 
contexts in which Adorno uses it. Sometimes “impulse” names something that 
resembles a Freudian drive type, at others, an intuitive sense of what needs to be done, 
and, in discussions of concrete moral actions, a kind of spontaneous yet correct moral 
reaction by those who are appropriately attuned. The first two together might appear 
to have no bearing on morality as they are natural rather than acquired states. The 
second, though, seems to be represented in the ideal, quoted by Freyenhagen, of the 
“good animal” (Adorno, 1973, p. 299). The third should be objectionable to Adorno’s 
critical theory since moral attunement of this kind is possible only where the 
socialising community is actually capable of morality. Adorno, of course, sees only 
the absence of the conditions for genuine moral formation in modern society. 
 
It is this third option that we normally find in Aristotelian thinking. We could think 
that in a general Aristotelian framework, “impulses” would be a reasonably 
acceptable label for the right kind of sensitivity. This sensitivity is the capacity to 
respond in morally recognisable ways to what we immediately perceive in a given 
situation. The Aristotelian believes that we gain that sensitivity through the right kind 
of education. The process of education is more like enculturation than instruction in 
principles. We are political beings because we are members of a polis, or something 
like it, whose norms we adopt and eventually express and enact in individual ways. A 
similar notion of ethical formation is captured in Hegel’s report: “When a father asked 
him for advice about the best way of educating his son in ethical matters, a 
Pythagorean replied: ‘Make him the citizen of a state with good laws’” (Hegel, 1991, 
p. 196). We know that no such enculturation is open to the Adornian agent. Second 
nature is thoroughly compromised. 
 
Freyenhagen sees a connection between the Aristotelian position and a notion of 
impulses that, it turns out, belongs to the second meaning above (i.e., the intuitive 
sense of what needs to be done). He writes: “Adorno claims that the demand that no 
one should be tortured is ‘true as an impulse, as a reaction to the news that torture is 
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going on somewhere’” (p. 249). Freyenhagen characterises this reaction as one which 
is “untutored” (p. 250). This means, then, that we are somehow capable of the right 
kind of moral response without prior moral instruction. It may be that moral education 
deprives us of our reliable impulses. The impulses are not wrong in what they 
intimate to us about what we need. Freyenhagen believes these impulses “express the 
objective interests of us as the life form we are and could become” (p. 250). They give 
us a sense of what we are entitled to, what we ought to be, and that some actions are 
wrong in that they stand in the way of our entitlements. Freyenhagen is again 
identifying a kind of brute aversion to pain as a legitimate interest but he also notes 
that those interests extend to unrealised potential (“what we could become”). The 
latter makes this a discussion about values, that is, about the worth of human beings in 
their fullness, in their life projects, and self-development. 
 
No doubt there are romantic primitivists who believe that our natural capacity for 
goodness is spoiled by civilisation. Freyenhagen0s discussion of Rousseau in this 
regard is quite apt. It is less clear that there are, however, Aristotelians among them 
(though the natural law strand of that theory might hold that there is some natural way 
of responding rightly to situations where something moral is at stake). Since 
Freyenhagen does not want to ascribe any kind of metaphysical view to Adorno he 
cannot be willing to ascribe any inherent sense of value to him either. A sense of 
value which owes nothing to experience or social formation is arguably a piece of 
metaphysics. Untutored responses to complex moral situations—i.e., those in which 
one0s future potential is at stake—leave Adorno with that very commitment, however. 
We can see from Adorno0s texts why Freyenhagen prefers to present Adorno this way. 
Adorno does indeed reject the action-inhibiting ratiocinations of Kantian theory. The 
notion of a “good animal” is itself an anti-Kantian provocation. There is a difference 
though between acting without crippling reflections—“one thought too many,” and so 
on—and infusing untutored reactions with a kind of value orientation. 
 
No statement in Adorno0s texts directly excludes the “untutored” theory of our sense 
of our interests and entitlements. That position, though, does seem to sit awkwardly 
alongside a core claim of Adorno0s general philosophical position: the mediation 
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thesis.2 Normative primitivism looks in that light like a commitment to what Adorno 
calls and exposes as the error of “immediacy”: i.e., that there are states of affairs 
whose truth is independent of human judgment. Adorno sees naive realism in 
epistemology, for example, as a wrong-headed commitment to immediacy in that it 
does not recognise that what it takes to be given by the external world—the things of 
experience—and passively received by us has a historical background. That 
background determines most if not all (Adorno is ambivalent on this point) of how 
things appear to us and how we respond to them. Normative primitivism would, we 
might suggest, be guilty of an analogous naiveté in claiming that our normative 
interest in ourselves has a kind of independence from experience even though it 
comes replete with motivating interests shaped by historical considerations about 
human value and meaningful life. The untutored would be critically exposed as 
socialised, or, to put it another way, mediated by society and its values. 
 
Now, it is fairly likely that Adorno would be willing to deviate from central principles 
were “the object” of analysis to require it. There might be times, to be more specific, 
where immediacy commitments could not be properly explained as mediated ones. 
The lack of theoretical rigidity is characteristic of Adorno0s philosophical work. 
Nevertheless, there would have to be good grounds for deviating from the mediation 
thesis. Normative primitivism does not look like the right candidate in that it is 
freighted with knowledge: our immediate interests and sense of possible future ones. 
In highlighting Adorno0s commitment to that primitivism (my label), however, 
Freyenhagen points us towards a baffling feature of Adorno0s work. 
 
3. 
Among the attractions of Aristotelianism to conservatives is its opposition to Kantian 
varieties of moral evaluation. The Kantian is seen, typically, as divorcing us from our 
living immersion in our moral communities. Within that communal space, we enact 
the prevailing general norms in context-sensitive ways without having to discursively 
defend a principle as though it were perpetually provisional. The heroes of that world 
are phronimoi, individuals who act appropriately, sensitively, and, indeed, without the 
                                                 
2 As Adorno puts it: “[i]dealism was the first to make clear that the reality in which men live is not 
unvarying and independent of them. Its shape is human and even absolutely extra-human nature is 
mediated through consciousness (Adorno, 1982, p. 28). 
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burden of complex moral reasoning. Moral actors live within certain practices that 
frame what is right and what is permissible for them. Action has a kind of spontaneity 
in that knowing how to respond rightly is a feature of the properly formed moral agent. 
When we step outside practices, as Kantians are said to do, we engage in a garbled 
form of moral evaluation, built out of de-contextualised reasons that have no grip on 
the persons we really are. We then lose some kind of organic connection between 
moral thinking and moral action. A human being whose relation to moral principles is 
reflection alone turns praxis into mere implementation. This process disrupts and 
destroys our authentic normative and practices bound dispositions. Freyenhagen 
explains: 
 
… if one responded to the Aristotelian account of what we have reasons to do qua 
human beings by asking for such grounding (for example, asking questions such as 
“why act on our objective interests?” or “why be human?”), then one would miss the 
point. It would be to overlook that all the normativity which is required is already 
given and accounted for, that all what can and needs to be said has been said (p. 236). 
 
Little wonder Aristotelian conservatives see good societies as those where individuals 
are morally cohesive, where values are intuitive and where radical assessment of 
those values never arises. Socrates is, in this regard, a menace. But Adorno, too, is 
willing to adopt a Socratic approach in which the content of what we claim to be our 
“objective interests” and what we understand by “human” are subject even to 
crippling, action-sapping scrutiny. We cannot, Freyenhagen acknowledges, rely on 
any practice. And, he is surely right to observe, “it sometimes seems as if 
Aristotelians lack critical distance to the traditional social practices and institutions 
which allegedly underwrote the exercise of the virtues in pre-modern times—
something which Adorno is not guilty of” (p. 252). We must, Adorno maintains, 
ensure that our actions are incompatible with any kind of precept or prejudice which 
might lead to justification for or acceptance of the torment of other human beings. 
This, though, turns moral action into a painstaking and essentially revisable process. 
No previous decision guarantees that we will get the next one right. Here, the 
difference between the Aristotelian proper and Adorno is not simply that the latter is a 
little wiser about the ways of the world: Adorno must exclude the ideal of ethical 
spontaneity for so long as we live in the false world. Freyenhagen successfully argues 
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that Adorno does not bring the notion of humanity into question. But Adorno seems 
very far from believing that morality gains nothing from discourse and debate (“all 
what can and needs to be said has been said”). This would imply that the notion of 
humanity by itself made it easy to act without reflection: specific responses would 
flow from that self-explaining notion. That we are to “arrange” our “thoughts and 
actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself” (Adorno, 1973, p. 365) involves, if 
anything, the deliberate denial of spontaneity or the intuitive use of notions of 
humanity. Every urge or intuition we have must be measured against a principle. 
 
4. 
Freyenhagen’s Adorno occupies a complex and unique space. He is committed to a 
kind of immediate sense that we can negatively relate to present and prospective 
interests. The present ones come down to avoiding pain, the future ones refer to 
potential that has yet to be realised. The rigour of this position may just threaten to 
undermine it as an explanation of our morally relevant interests in ourselves. Its strict 
adherence to negativity means that our interests ought not to be linked to any value 
conception we actually hold since that conception, being a positive one, might be 
implicated in the false world. The very notion of interests recedes into abstraction. 
What it might mean for any individual to worry about their own loss in the context of 
their own individual lives is not readily licensed by the theory. 
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